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NSPEAKABLE
SUSPICIONS

THE
RACIST
CONSENSUAL
ENCOUNTER
By Peter Schoenburg and Risa Evans

In recent years, law enforcement officials
have honed a new technique for fighting
the "War on Drugs:" the suspicionless
police sweep of stations and vehicles
involved in interstate mass transportation.
Single officers or groups of officers
approach unfortunate individuals in
busses, trains, stations and airline termi
nals. A targeted traveller is requested to
show identification and tickets, explain
the purpose of his or her travels, and final
ly, at times, to consent to a luggage search.
As long as "a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to
cooperate," the encounter between the
law-enforcement official and the traveller
is deemed "consensual," not subject to
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
In theory, "consensual" encounters are
both non-intrusive and randomly applied.
In practice, of course, they are neither.
These invasions of travellers' privacy can
be burdensome and intimidating. As Jus

tice Marshall noted in his dissent to Flori
da V. Bostick, officers displaying badges,
weapons and other indicia of authority
accost travellers without advising them
that they are free not to speak to the offi
cers. On many occasions, the encounters
occur in the cramped confines of a bus
during temporary intermediate stops, with
officers towering between the passenger
selected
for the interview and the bus's
4
exit. By inconveniencing and intimidat
ing individuals who use public trans
portation, "consensual" encounters bur
den the constitutionally protected right to
interstate travel.
The Supreme Court's ready acceptance
of the burden created by consensual
encounters marks a troubling societal
shift away from the promise of individ
ual liberty. Equally troubling, however,
is the burden's uneven distribution,
which marks an abandonment of equal
protection principles. In theory, the bur

den created by "consensual" encounters
is borne equally by all members of the
society that supposedly benefits from
these encounters, because law enforce
ment officers initiate them randomly and
without articulable suspicion.
However, as Justice Marshall notes,
"the basis of the decision to single out
particular passengers during a suspi
cionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable." In practice,
race often influences or determines an
officer's decision to approach a traveller
for an interview. The "War on Drugs"
means not only an infringement on their
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liberty to come and go at will, but also a
denial of equal protection.
As the Los Angeles riots so poignant
ly demonstrated, the harm from racially
discriminatory encounters between police
officers and individual citizens extends to
the entire community. In the wake of the
riots, a nationwide poll showed that 84
percent of blacks believe they do not
receive fair or equal treatment in the
courts. The public's justified perception
that the criminal justice system discrimi
nates against blacks and other minorities
erodes both confidence in the system and
willingness to rely on it.

The question of whether race or nation
ality can be a factor in a law enforcement
officer's decision to detain an individual
has, up until now, been raised most often
at suppression hearings, where defen
dants who were stopped for investigation
based partially on their race or racial
appearance argue that they were detained
without reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Unfortunately, this approach has not been
particularly helpful. While lower court
cases have not allowed race to be the sole
basis for an investigative stop, they have
often allowed it to tip the scales of rea
sonable suspicion.

PETER SCHOENBURG is a principal in tine firm of
Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Cron &
Schoenburg, Albuquerque, New Mexico. A former
public defender, assistant attorney general, and
chief assistant federal defender, he specializes in
criminal defense.
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In the leading case on this question,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the
Supreme Court held that the apparent
Mexican descent of riders in a vehicle near
the U.S.-Mexican border did not, by itself,
provide reasonable suspicion for a rov
ing border patrol to subject the vehicle to
a Terry stop. The Court did, however,
allow the appearance of Mexican ances
try to be a factor providing reasonable
suspicion in border area stops if other fac
tors are present as well. Notably, although
a substantial portion of the defendant's
brief was devoted to arguing that stops
based on race violated the equal protec
tion component of the Fifth Amendment,
the Court never addressed the issue.
Unlike investigative stops, there are no
Fourth Amendment limits on "consensu
al" encounters. An officer can target any
one, whenever and for whatever reason
he chooses. The absence of an informant's
tip or other information to guide an offi
cer's discretion invites the officer to base
his targeting decisions — consciously or
not — on stereotypes.'^ The Fourth
Amendment offers no protection to defen
dants who have been selected for "con
sensual" encounters based partially or
even solely on the basis of invidious racial
stereotypes. Happily, however, the story
does not end here.

The Solution: Equal Protection
Limits On Executive Discretion
The absence of formal limits on law
enforcement officers' discretion over whom
to target for "consensual" encounters is typ
ical of executive branch decision-making.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the
evils associated with "standardless and
unconstrained discretion." Thus, as the
Court has consistently recognized, execu
tive and administrative discretion is limit
ed by the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution.
Law enforcement officers may not
enforce laws in a racially discriminatory
manner.
Prosecutors may not consider race
while exercising their virtually unlimited
discretion to peremptorily strike jurors.
Prosecutors may not consider race when
exercising their similarly unfettered dis
cretion in deciding whom to prosecute,
or whether to file a "substantial assistance"
motion. Nor may they consider race in
deciding whether to move a defendant
from state to federal court. Decisions to
approach certain individuals for "con
sensual" encounters should be similarly
subject to the equal protection require
ment that they not be based on race.

Apparently, no lower court has direct
ly ruled on whether equal protection prin
ciples prohibit race from playing a role in
"consensual" encounters. On at least three
occasions, federal courts have approved
convictions growing from consensual
encounters in which a defendant was tar
geted in part because of his race. How
ever, even as the courts managed for var
ious reasons to avoid doing justice in the
individual cases before them, they indi
cated in dicta that race-based interview
decisions are constitutionally suspect. Addi
tionally, dissents in both cases articulate
clear visions of the equal protection lim
its on "consensual" encounters. Along with
Brignoni-Ponce znd Supreme Court opin
ions about the equal protection limits on
executive discretion, these cases provide
a framework for challenging racially-moti
vated "consensual" encounters.
In United States v. Taylor,defendant
Taylor, who was "poorly attired," was
the only black to emerge in the initial
group of passengers exiting from a plane
that arrived in Memphis from Miami. The
Sixth Circuit decided that because the
encounter that led to his arrest and con
viction on cocaine charges was "consen
sual," it did not need to consider whether
Taylor was stopped because of his race,
or whether the incorporation of a racial
component into the Drug Enforcement
Administration's (DEA's) drug courier pro
file would violate equal^protection and
due process guarantees. However, the
court apparently recognized the inade
quacy of this reasoning. Taken to its log
ical conclusion, the court's reasoning
would mean that even if police deliber
ately target ONLY blacks for interviews,
courts can do nothing as long as the
encounters are consensual. Thus, after
announcing its holding, the court noted
in the next breath that if facts in the record
indicated that race played a role in the
"consensual" encounter that led to the
defendant's conviction, this would give
rise to "due process and equal protection
constitutional implications cognizable by
th[e] court." Specifically, the defendant
would have to show that:
[He] was selected for a consensual
interview because he was an
African-American, that the law
enforcement officers at the Mem
phis Airport implemented a gener
al practice or pattem that primarily
target minorities for consensual
interviews, or that they had incor
porated a racial component into the
drug courier profile
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In a thorough and stinging dissent.Judge
Keith, joined by three other judges, criti
cized the majority's failure to subject the
consensual encounter to equal protection
scmtiny, when the record showed that "[t]he
only truly objective fact that could have
given rise to the officers' [initial] suspicion
was that Taylor was black." "The majority,
by refusing to address the clear evidence
of race-based conduct, has endorsed the
frightening proposition that a defendant's
subsequent, alleged consent legitimizes a
governmental practice that violates the prin
ciples embodied in the equal protection
clause." Judge Keith pointed out, "the
majority offers no citation of authority for
the proposition that race discrimination in
law enforcement is unreviewable or con
stitutional." Indeed, as discussed above,
there is abundant case law to the contrary.
In United States v. Weaver, the Eighth
Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that
he was stopped without reasonable artic
ulable suspicion of criminal activity, where
a DEA officer's decision to interview and
then search the bags of the defendant was
based partially on his observation that
Weaver was a "'roughly dressed' young
black male." The court held that the ini
tial interaction between the DEA officer and
the defendant was "consensual," and that
the officer's subsequent decision to search
the defendant's bags was supported by rea
sonable suspicion.
The defendant had been arrested at
Kansas City International Airport after arriv
ing on a flight from Los Angeles. The DEA
officer testified that he had "intelligence
information and also past arrest history on
two black — all black street gangs from
Los Angeles called the Crips and the Bloods.
They are notorious for transporting cocaine
into the B^nsas City area from lis Ange
les for sale. Most of them are "young, rough
ly dressed black males. Based on this,
the court approved the officer's reliance,
in conjunction with other factors,'" on the
fact that Weaver "was a roughly dressed
young black male who might be a mem
ber of a Los Angeles street gang that had
been bringing narcotics into the Kansas
City area." However, just as the Taylor
court had done, the court in Weaver court
tempered its holding with an acknowl
edgment that there are at least some equal
protection limits on "consensual" encoun
ters. The court said.
We agree with the dissent that large
groups of our citizens should not
be regarded by law enforcement
officers as presumptively criminal
based upon their race. We would

gration officials to rely in part on these
correlations in their decisions about whom
to stop. By contrast, there is absolutely no
logical correlation between race and drug
courier status. Nor is there proven an actu
al correlation. Thus, there is no reason,
except invidious discrimination, for drug
agents to rely on race in deciding whom
to burden with consensual encounters.
In the arena of forfeitures, the recent
case of Jones v. United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, 819
F.Supp. 698, 1993 WL 127094, at *26
(M.D. Tenn. April 21, 1993) contains a
helpful equal protection analysis of racebased airport police encounters. The
court cites statistics on the racial com
position of commercial air travelers and
describes evidence of impermissible
racial targeting by airport DEA agents.
Although "deeply troubled" by other inci
dents (including a DEA airport encounter
with the black producer of a 60 Minutes
segment about Mr. Jones' case) the court
finds no evidence that Jones' encounter
was racially motivated.

not hesitate to hold that a solely
race-based suspicion of dmg couri
er status would not pass constitu
tional muster. Accordingly, had [the
DEA agent] relied solely upon the
fact of Weaver's race as a basis for
his suspicions, we would have a
different case before us.
In dissent, Chief Judge Arnold wrote,
I am not prepared to say that [race]
could never be relevant. If, for exam
ple, we had evidence that young
blacks in Los Angeles were more
prone to drug offenses than young
whites, the fact that a young person
is black might be of some signifi
cance, though even then it would
be dangerous to give it much weight.
I do not know of any such evidence.
Use of race as a factor simply rein
forces the kind of stereotyping that
lies behind drug-courier profiles.
When public officials begin to regard
large groups of citizens as pre
sumptively criminal, this country is
in a perilous situation indeed.

Litigation Strategy —
A New Approach Suggested by

Brignoni-Ponce w2iS a Fourth Amend
ment rather than an equal protection
case, arising in the context of a Terry stop
rather than a "consensual" encounter.
However, the Court's reasons for allow
ing the border patrol to consider Mexican
ancestry at all is instructive:

Batson v. Kentucky

The hurdle that the defense must clear at
a suppression hearing placed by Taylor
and the other cases cited above presents
a daunting challenge. To be able to
demonstrate, as Taylor requires, that a
DEA agent relied solely upon a defen
dant's race as the basis for initiating a con
sensual encounter is akin to proving
Large numbers of native-born and
thought crime. In the same way that prenaturalized citizens have the physi
textual traffic stops are difficuk to attack,
cal characteristics identified with Mex
proving that race was the sole basis of an
ican ancestry, and even in the border
encounter will be a difficult task.
area a relatively small proportion of
Approaches should include:
them are aliens. [ ] The likelihood that
• Discovering the individual agent's
any given person of Mexican ances
prior police reports to demonstrate a pat
try is an alien is high enough to make
tem and practice of consensually encoun
Mexican appearance a relevant fac
tor, but standing alone it does not jus
tering people of color and/or members
of the underclass.
tify stopping all Mexican-Americans
• The discovery of plane/train pas
to ask if they are aliens.
senger manifests and the interview of other
n this paragraph, Brignoni-Ponce passengers to demonstrate the overall
provides, by implication, a basis racial composition of the travelers and the
for rejecting race as a factor in disparate number of people of color who
decision-making by officials have been confronted by police.
• Discovery of any law enforcement
charged with enforcing drug
laws. Mexican aliens are, by def profiles to flush out de facto racist ele
inition, of Mexican descent. As ments and characteristics.
However, before marching ahead with
the Court held, there is at least
some logical correlation between Mexi the evidence as described above, the court
can appearance and alienage. Moreover, should be presented with an alternative.
in the torder area, there is also some actu The alternative is embodied in the analy
al correlation, however tenuous, between sis of race-based preemptory challenges
the two. Thus, it is reasonable for immi in Batson v. Kentucky. In Batson, the court

I

found that the equal protection clause for
bids a prosecutor from challenging jurors
on the assumption that black jurors are not
impartial. TTie court first recognized the
societal harm caused when jurors were
excluded based on race. "Selection pro
cedures that purposely exclude black per
sons from juries undermine public confi
dence in the fairness of our system of
justice." To require proof by defense coun
sel of the repeated striking of black jurors
was rejected as a "crippling" evidentiary
burden. Instead, the court permitted defen
dant to make out a prima facia case show
ing that "the totality of the relevant facts
gives rise to an inference of discriminato
ry purpose." The burden then shifts to the
state to show that permissible selection cri
teria and procedures were at play.
Although there is no case law support
yet, encouraging a judge to adopt a Bat
son analysis of race-based consensual
encounters is a critical first step. By per
mitting a prima facia case to shift the bur
den, a meaningful review of the reasons
behind a consensual encounter is possi
ble. Once the defense has shown that the
defendant was approached for no other
apparent reason than his race, the burden
should shift to the government to articu
late non-racial factors that precipitated the
encounter. Without the burden shift, the
defense faces a Mission Impossible.
The parallels between the exercise of
peremptory challenges and the initiation of
consensual encounters is clear. The same
assumptions regarding people of color are
at work in both situations. Race is equated
with the likelihood of ongoing criminal activ
ity in the minds of many police officers. The
societal harm in discriminatory official action
is equally devastating. A Batson-Vfpe. analy
sis begins the process of accountability and
visibility over a police officer's otherwise
discretionary act.
As Justice Blackmun pointedly observed,
"In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take
account of race. There is no other
41
way.
If criminal defense lawyers will not begin
this candid, judicial examination of the
influence of race on police behavior, who
will?^^ •
Notes
1. Florida v, Bostick,
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct.
2382, 2384, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2390.
4. Id.
5. The constitutional right to interstate travel is
fundamental and well-established. See, e.g., Unit
ed States V. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59, 86 S. Ct.
1170, 16 L. Ed 2d 239 (1966). Government action
need not actually deter travel in order to trigger
constitutional scrutiny. Rather, "[a]ny classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.
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unless shown to be necessary to promote a com
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
Dunn v, Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339, 92 S. Ct. 995,
31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1971) (citation omitted) (first empha
sis added; second in original).
6. Id. at 2390 (emphasis in original).
7. Seeid. at 2390, n.l. SeealsoV.S. v. Taylor, 956
F.2d 572, 581 n.l (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. 404, 121 L. Ed. 2d 330 (1992) (offi
cer admitted at evidentiary hearing that at least 75
percent of those followed and questioned in con
sensual police stops are black); Sheri Lyn Johnson,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale
L. J. 214, 234 (1983) ("Although the DEA has refused
to commit the entire [drug courier] profile to writ
ing, the profile clearly contains a racial component").
8. Today is not the first time in history that blacks
have been subjected to this dual deprivation. In
many parts of colonial America, blacks were required
to carry "passes." Both before and after the Civil
War, blacks were barred from entering certain states.
5eeTracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right to Loco
motion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1260 at n.4 (1990).
9. "The Trickle Down of Judicial Racism" from
Judge Stephen Reinhardt's commencement speech
at Golden Gate University in San Francisco, excerpt
ed in Harper's Magazine, August 1992, pages 15-17.
10. See Sheri Lyn Johnson, Race and the Deci
sion to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L. J. 214, 225-237,
and cases cited therein. Johnson notes that although
race — by definition — cannot affect reasonable
suspicion calculations unless it is statistically relat
ed to suspected criminal activity, the lower courts
accept it as a factor without making any inquiry into
whether there is, in fact, such a relationship.
11. 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d. 607
(1974).

12. For example, consider a detective's testimony
at a suppression hearing in U.S. v. Lewis, 728 F.Supp.
784 (D.D.C.), order reversed, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). 'When asked by the court why he had
chosen to approach the defendant, a young black
male, during a bus sweep, the deteaive said, "There
was nothing particular I saw in that man, no artic
ulable thing that I saw that I just walked up to him
and asked him if I could search him after identify
ing myself" Id. at 786.
13. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.
Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed, 2d. 660 (1979).
14. Yick 'Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6
S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1866). See also Hall v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir.
1978) (police department may not instruct banks to
target blacks in surveillance photographs, absent a
proven and compelling state interest).
15. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct.
1712, 90 L. Ed. 69 (1986).
16. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct.
501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1961); see a&o Wayte v. Unit
ed States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d.
547 (1985).
17. 'Wade v. U.S.,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1840,
118 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1992).
18. U.S. v. -Williams, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir.
1992).
19. 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. 404 (1992).
20. Id. at 574.
21. Id. at 578.
22. Id. at 579.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 582.
25. Id. at 583.
26. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S.Ct.
829, 121 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1992).

27. The court does not indicate whether the defen
dant actually raised the issue of equal protection.
28. Id. at 392.
29. Id. at 394, n.2.
30. The officer also relied on the facts that the
defendant: arrived from a source city for drugs;
moved rapidly through the airport toward a taxicab; had two carry-on bags and no checked lug
gage; carried no identification; had no copy of his
ticket; appeared very nervous when he talked to
the officer; did not mention that the purpose of his
travel was to visit his mother until the end of the
"consensual" interview. Id. at *7.
31. Id. at 394.
32. Id. at 394, n.2.
33. Id. at 397.
34. The Court did not mention the Equal Pro
tection Clause once in the opinion.
35. Id. at 886-87.
36. The Court supported this analysis in a later
case. United States v. Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
564, n. 17, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1116 (1975),
noting that apparent Mexican ancestry might not
be a legitimate basis for stopping people at a check
point near the Canadian border.
37. 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
38. Id. at 89.
39. Id. at 87.
40. Id. at 94.
41. Regis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407, 98 S. Ct.
2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d. 750 (1978), Blackmun, J., (dis
senting).
42. The Christopher Commission's investigation
of the Los Angeles Police Department reported that
one-fourth of police officers polled agreed that racial
bias on the part of officers toward minority citizens
currently exists and contributes to a negative inter
action between police and the community.
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